Public-Private Partnership : Controlling Illicit Trade of Tobacco in the Era of Fast Change
| dc.contributor.author | Szwarc, Monika | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-03-04T12:52:51Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-03-04T12:52:51Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-03-02 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The analysis of the international legal framework and the comparison between the tobacco industry other industries which face illicit trade leads to the conclusion that the regulation of States' obligations are much more comprehensive with respect to eradicating the illicit tobacco trade. This in turn must lead to the conclusion that drawing analogies between other sectors and the tobacco industry may not be useful for the identification of possible new means of combatting illicit trade. As was presented above, the legal obligations (established in order to combat global illicit trade in tobacco) restrict, to a considerable extent, the margin of appreciation left to States, in particular EU Member States. Taking into account the proviso of Article 5.3 of the FCTC, Guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3 of the FCTC, as well as the FCTC Anti-Illicit Trade Protocol and the Tobacco Products Directive, it may be concluded that there will be growing pressure from WHO towards Parties of these international agreements to limit (if not break) cooperation with the tobacco industry. Furthermore, the analysis of abundant literature on eliminating illicit trade in tobacco reveals that there is a considerable body of publications which (without entering into details and without assessing its reasonableness) casts doubts on the tobacco industry’s cooperation with governments and public bodies aimed at combatting illicit trade, questioning the reliability of data gathered by the tobacco industry (Allen W A Gallagher et. Al, 2018), as well as involvement of the tobacco industry in establishing the global track and trace system (see for recent assessment on this point Gilmore, Gallagher, Rowell, 2019; Crosbie, Bialous, A Glantz, 2019). This may also have impact on the reluctance of Member States to engage in new methods of cooperation with the tobacco industry. On the other hand, the survey of the WHO database on reporting implementation of the FCTC reveals that not all Member States are aware of Article 5.3 of the FCTC, nor have they implemented internal policies in order to implement this provision. Mostly, prohibition in Article 5.3 of the FCTC is understood in a narrow way, as prohibition of interference with “setting and implementing their public health policies”, namely within the legislative process. For that reason, reporting Member States focus on the elimination of conflict of interests and on transparency of mutual relations between public bodies and the tobacco industry. Only Cyprus explicitly denied existence of agreements with the industry. It is expected that the discussion between rigorous interpretation of Art. 5.3 FCTC by WHO on the one hand, and more flexible interpretation from States on the other, may continue. In addition, the FCTC Anti-Illicit Trade Protocol excludes interference by the tobacco industry only in the context of the track and trace system (article 8). It is clear that there is no room for MoUs, where the States are under an obligation to introduce binding obligations on the tobacco industry actors, such as licences, approvals and control, due diligence, the track and trace system, record-keeping etc., as well as when they are obligated to introduce definitions of offences and criminal sanctions. Still, partnerships with the tobacco industry are not explicitly excluded in the context of investigative techniques (art. 19 of the Protocol) nor in the context of international cooperation (art. 20 and forth). It seems that there may still be room for cooperation in this context, with due regard to Article 4(2) of the Protocol, which requires States to ensure “maximum possible transparency with respect to any interactions they may have with the tobacco industry” when implementing the Protocol. | pl_PL |
| dc.description.sponsorship | PMI Impact - Project: Controlling Illicit Trade of Tobacco in the Era of Fast Change | pl_PL |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | <<s. 4>> Public-private partnerships (PPPs) as a (new) model of governance <<s. 5-8>> Experience from other (non-tobacco) industries <<s. 9-12>> Comparison of the tobacco sector with other sectors facing illicit trade <<s. 13>> Conclusions | |
| dc.identifier.citation | M. Szwarc, Public-Private Partnership : Controlling Illicit Trade of Tobacco in the Era of Fast Change, Warsaw 2020. | pl_PL |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.5281/zenodo.3696312 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://e-bp.inp.pan.pl/handle/123456789/135 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | pl_PL |
| dc.publisher | INP PAN | pl_PL |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Reports; | |
| dc.subject | partnerstwo publiczno-prywatne | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | podrobione towary | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | wyroby medyczne | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | narkotyki | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | nielegalny obrót gospodarczy | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | cyberprzestępczość | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | nielegalny obrót dobrami kultury | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | zwalczanie | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | Interpol | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | WHO | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | wyroby tytoniowe | pl_PL |
| dc.subject | public-private partnership | |
| dc.subject | counterfeit goods | en |
| dc.subject | medical devices | |
| dc.subject | drugs | en |
| dc.subject | illicit trade | en |
| dc.subject | cybercrime | en |
| dc.subject | illicit trade in cultural goods | en |
| dc.subject | combating | en |
| dc.subject | Interpol | en |
| dc.subject | tobacco products | en |
| dc.title | Public-Private Partnership : Controlling Illicit Trade of Tobacco in the Era of Fast Change | pl_PL |
| dc.title.alternative | Public-Private Partnership | pl_PL |
| dc.type | Working Paper | pl_PL |
| project.funder.name | PMI Impact - Project: Controlling Illicit Trade of Tobacco in the Era of Fast Change |