Organizacja ds. Współpracy Gospodarczej i Rozwoju (OECD)
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Item AGENCY INDEPENDENCE(2016) Gal, Michal S.Item COMPETITION AGENCIES, INDEPENDENCE, AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS(2014) Kovacic, William E.Item COMPETITION AGENCIES: WHAT IF THEY ARE NOT INDEPENDENT? AND ARE THERE ANY DISADVANTAGES TO BEING INDEPENDENT?(2016) Fels, Allan; Jennings, HilaryItem ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COMPETITION CASES: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS(2014) Wood, Diane P.Item Item Free Movement of Judgments: Increasing Deterrence of International Cartels Though Jurisdictional Reliance(2008-10) Gal, Michal S.This article challenges the conventional wisdom that not much can be done under the existing atomistic system of antitrust enforcement to solve the problem of suboptimal deterrence of international cartels. Low deterrence results from the fact that international cartels are generally prosecuted by only a fraction of the jurisdictions harmed by them and that monetary sanctions in those jurisdictions are generally based on harm to their domestic markets only. To solve this problem, this article proposes a novel legal tool which enables countries to adopt and rely upon foreign findings of international hard-core cartels, provided that the foreign decisions meet criteria that ensure that such reliance is reasonable and fair. As elaborated, this free movement of judgments holds potential to overcome the main obstacles to efficient deterrence and to significantly increase both domestic as well as global welfare. Its costs can also be largely overcome by designing appropriate solutions. The political implications are also not prohibitive. As shown, jurisdictions already rely on foreign judgments that do not significantly differ from the decisions at hand.Item INDEPENDENCE OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES - FROM DESIGNS TO PRACTICES(2016)Agency independence from political power is a key element of an effective competition regime. Competition authorities differ from each other and they operate in jurisdictions which often have significant legal, political and cultural differences. Thus, there is no one size-fit-for-all model for independence. However, there are some safeguards which can help agencies establish an arm’s length relationship with their government. This paper discusses these safeguards and focusses on issues concerning appointment and dismissal of top management, the status of the agency, resources, priority-setting and supervision, and objectives of competition law. Although these legal and structural provisions do not automatically lead to a de facto independent agency, they are nevertheless important determinants for independence.