INDEPENDENCE OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES - FROM DESIGNS TO PRACTICES

dc.date.accessioned2021-07-20T09:34:42Z
dc.date.available2021-07-20T09:34:42Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.description.abstractAgency independence from political power is a key element of an effective competition regime. Competition authorities differ from each other and they operate in jurisdictions which often have significant legal, political and cultural differences. Thus, there is no one size-fit-for-all model for independence. However, there are some safeguards which can help agencies establish an arm’s length relationship with their government. This paper discusses these safeguards and focusses on issues concerning appointment and dismissal of top management, the status of the agency, resources, priority-setting and supervision, and objectives of competition law. Although these legal and structural provisions do not automatically lead to a de facto independent agency, they are nevertheless important determinants for independence.pl_PL
dc.identifier.urihttps://e-bp.inp.pan.pl/handle/123456789/481
dc.language.isoenpl_PL
dc.rights.licenseCC0
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/public-domain/cc0/
dc.titleINDEPENDENCE OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES - FROM DESIGNS TO PRACTICESpl_PL
dc.typeOtherpl_PL
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